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Modern economies are heavily dependent on the corporate form of doing
business. The sheer scale of modern commercial activity, once it goes beyond the
individual store and workshop, increasingly demands capital beyond the resources of
most individual entrepreneurs. Although the capital needs could in some cases be met by
partnership, the partnership form has proved rather inflexible and is utilized primarily for
very small enterprises and for the professions. Some professional organizations using the
partnership form—such as accounting and law firms—have taken advantage in the
United States of various special statutory entity forms, such as limited liability
partnerships and limited liability corporations, that grant limited liability but cannot be
easily used as a source of large-scale capital from public investors.1
The use of companies to pool large sums of capital and therefore to raise capital
for large new commercial ventures has been increasingly common since the Dutch and
English East India companies were organized at the beginning of the seventeenth
century.2 By the twentieth century corporations became the dominant organizational
vehicle for commercial ventures almost without exception throughout the world.
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Allen (2003, p. 76–79); Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire (2006, p. 53–54). The choice of these
organizational forms is often dictated, of course, by tax considerations.
2
See East India Company and Dutch East India Company, Encyclopedia Britannica Online. There were
English precedents for the English East India Company, of which the first was perhaps the Russia
Company of 1553. Scott (1912, p. 18).

The Corporation in Historical Perspective
The corporation was an institution that helped to solve the long distance trade
problem of early Europe, just as were the various enforcement institutions that helped to
bridge the separation of the quid and the quo.3 At least in England the corporation was
much more important in long-distance trade than it was in domestic commerce. The
English East India Company received a charter from the Crown in 1600.4 But companies
had existed for centuries before they were used for economic ends. Previously they had
been, in England, “regulated companies” limited to non-profit purposes.5 Only after
regulated companies began to be chartered by the English crown for trading purposes
were they gradually superseded for such purposes by joint stock companies.6 These joint
stock companies were not chartered by the state but rather represented a private sector
contractual arrangement.7 Over time transferable shares of joint stock companies became
common de facto if not de jure,8 and only later did limited liability become common.
That shareholders could not be held liable for the debts of the company was not fully
established until the enactment by Parliament of the 1855 and 1856 limited liability acts.9
Even in the early days of the trading company these predecessors of the modern
corporation provided a vehicle for assembling capital from a large number of merchants
sufficient to finance not just the especially large ships that, sailing beyond the protection
of the Royal Navy, had to be armed, but also the capital involved in the crew and
provisioning costs for the two to three years involved in sailing to the Indian
subcontinent and beyond to the Spice Islands and Java and returning with valuable and
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Kindleberger (1984, p. 196). See on the separation of the quid and the quo, Kenneth W. Dam,
Institutions, History, and Economic Development (2006), available at
[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=875026], and sources cited therein.
4
An historical issue is whether the English or the Dutch East India Company were the first to be created.
It appears that the Dutch were the first to send regular sea voyages to East Asia but the English were the
first to charter a company, with the Dutch East India Company (VOC) having received a charter only in
1602. Harris (2005).
5
See Davis (1905) for a survey of the use of corporations and stressing their use for ecclesiastical,
municipal, gild, educational, and eleemosynary purposes in feudal and early modern Europe. Davis’
second volume continues the survey, including a discussion of the transition to the use of regulated
companies and then joint stock companies.
6
See generally Evans (1908, p. 339–45).
7
Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire (2006, p. 45).
8
Scott (1912, p. 442) states that “from an early period in England, shares were bought and sold with a
considerable degree of freedom.” Scott refers to a sixteenth century example—that is, before the East India
Company was organized. Scott (1912, p. 443). See Harris (2000, p. 114–27).
9
See discussion in Harris (2000, p. 127–32) and in Blumberg (1986 p. 177–586).
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exotic cargo.10 To undertake such ventures through partnerships would have had a
number of disadvantages. With several hundred partners, the legal mechanics would have
been unwieldy.11 Partnership law would probably have required a new partnership
agreement each time a particular partner died; one or more of the London-based
merchants backing the voyage almost certainly would have died during the lengthy
voyages requiring a new partnership agreement. Kuran has made a powerful case that the
failure of Islamic law to permit business in corporate form was a major impediment to
economic development, especially in Arab countries, at least until under the influence of
colonial powers the corporate form was added to those countries’ menu of legal
choices.12
In the case of the East India company ventures, the pattern of creating a separate
company for each voyage or group of voyages developed,13 thereby adding to the
economic advantages not just the assembly of capital and avoidance of the pitfalls of
partnership, but also the diversification of risk across multiple ventures; after all, sailing
to and from Asia was risky at the beginning of the seventeenth century and even in the
early years not all safely completed voyages, it appears, yielded net profits.14 The East
India Company was an early example of drawing capital not just from entrepreneurs
themselves (and their families), but also from passive investors.15 Although at first the
East India entrepreneurs used the regulated company form with separate accounts for
each voyage,16 they later turned to separate joint stock companies that apparently did not
have either a royal or a parliamentary charter; their legal characteristics were murky.17
Later, however, the East India Company itself was given a longer-term monopoly of
England-India trade and with it a charter, by this time however as a permanent joint stock
company.18
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Harris (2004, p. 10–11).
Harris (2000, p. 21).
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Kuran (2004) and Kuran (2003).
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Baskin and Miranti (1997, p. 64) and Chaudhuri (1965, p. 208–9).
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Chaudhuri (1965, p. 212) and Baskin and Miranti (1997, p. 72).
15
Chaudhuri (1965, p. 33).
16
Harris (2004, p. 31).
17
Evans (1908, p. 349–50).
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Evans (1908, p. 350). The sequence of the different forms in which the East Indian enterprise
functioned in the early years is not entirely clear. See, in addition to Evans (1908), Scott (1912, p. 150–65)
and Chandhuri (1965).
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Parliament later became the source of the privilege of incorporation in England,
and later the legislatures of the several states of the United States began to grant
corporate charters. Inevitably the practice of granting individual charters led to a merger
of politics and business. The problem was not so much that a businessman might bribe
politicians to obtain a charter, but that politics would drive business activity to the
advantage of particular politicians. In other words, “venal corruption” was not the
problem but rather, in the useful dichotomy of Wallis, “systematic corruption.” The latter
term, according to Wallis, embodies “the idea that political actors manipulated the
economic system to create economic rents that politicians could use to secure control of
the government.”19 This merger of politics and business thus created a serious Rule of
Law problem from both the political and the economic perspectives. Consequently, the
move to free incorporation in England in 1844, under general incorporation statutes
calling for articles of incorporation to be issued under administrative procedures to all
entrepreneurs meeting statutorily prescribed standards, was a major step toward a Rule of
Law.20
Even though the joint stock company was the predecessor of the modern
corporation, it did not acquire all at once the hallmarks of the modern corporation, such
as limited liability, legal personality and transferable shares.21 As in so many aspects of
economic development, the legal framework evolved. As previously noted, limited
liability became available in England for all corporate entities as a result of legislation in
1855 and 1856; prior to that time limited liability required an Act of Parliament and was
used only for large-scale undertakings such as canals and railroads.22 In the United States
limited liability had become available slightly earlier, in the 1830s, in some leading
commercial states.23 Limited liability in its entirety did not reach California until 1931.24
Whatever the validity of the LLSV Legal Origins hypothesis in the
contemporary world, it does not mean that common law countries were more progressive
in this legal evolution than continental countries, especially France. For example, today
most American lawyers and businessmen strongly approve of the concept of limited
19

Wallis (2004, Abstract).
On free incorporation, see Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005) and Harris (2000, p. 282–86).
21
See discussion of these three key concepts below.
22
Blumberg (1986, p. 583–85).
23
Baskin and Miranti (1997, p. 141–42).
24
Blumberg (1986, p. 597–99).
20
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partnerships (in which some partners invest but, not being managers, are not responsible
for the partnership’s debts beyond the value of their investment). Napoleon introduced
limited partnerships in 1807 in his Commercial Code, but the English judiciary held that
limited partnerships could not be recognized without a Parliamentary statute. The reason
is interesting in view of the widespread idea that the common law is more flexible and
more keyed to commercial needs than continental code writing. The reason for refusal of
English courts to recognize limited partnerships was the simple-minded notion that such
partnerships had always been contrary to the common law!25 (Harris observes that British
judges were from the tight-knit rank of barristers, who were overwhelmingly from the
landed classes and had few acquaintances among the merchant class and even dealt with
their merchant clients through intermediary solicitors; his observation suggests that the
common law of the time was truly autonomous and that any flexibility of the common
law at that time was strictly intellectual, not a response to economic changes. 26) In any
case, the French economy benefited from limited partnerships for half a century before
England even got around to confirming the availability of limited liability for
corporations in 1856 and for a century before Parliament passed the Limited Partnership
Act of 1907.27
Turning from legal rules to financial development, a problem with the Legal
Origins hypothesis is that it appears to apply among developed countries only to the postWorld War II world. Rajan and Zingales find that “financial markets in countries with a
Civil Law system were not less developed than those in countries with Common Law in
1913 and in 1929 but only after World War II.”28 Their data shows that France had 13.29
listed companies per million people in 1913 whereas the United States had only 4.75. As
late as 1960 France had twice as many listed companies per million people as the United
States. The United States surpassed France only during the 1970s,29 long after—it might
be noted—nearly all French law countries in today’s developing world had become
independent. Similarly, in 1913 the percentage of gross fixed capital raised in public
equity offers was roughly the same in France and Britain and more than three times
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Harris(2000, p. 30), See Lamereaux and Rosenthal (2005, p. 33).
Harris (2000, p. 230–249, especially p. 231–32).
27
Harris (2000, p. 30).
28
Rajan and Zingales (2003b, p. 42).
29
Rajan and Zingales (2003b, p. 17, Table 5).
26
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greater than in the United States.30 Thus, the notion that French law condemned French
law countries to inferior equity markets seems poorly supported historically within the
developed world.
Advantages of the Corporation Today
One of the reasons for the spread of the corporate form was that it has several
advantages beyond the pooling of capital. One, as previously noted, is limited liability of
the shareholders, which simply means that the corporation is liable for its debts but its
shareholders are not; shareholders are liable only for their own debts and therefore can
lose only what they have already invested in the corporation. Limited liability tends to
promote risk-taking (though founders of new enterprises find that they may have to
guarantee the corporation’s debts to induce creditors to provide loans).
Another advantage is that the corporation has a legal personality, meaning that it
can enter into contracts without requiring the signature of its shareholder owners or
indeed without even consulting them, at least for contracts in the ordinary course of
business. But legal personality also has advantages from the standpoint of property rights
and liability. The protection of the corporation’s assets from the creditors of the
shareholders has been called “entity shielding” (or alternatively “affirmative asset
partitioning”) because it permits a corporation to own assets and thereby to borrow on the
strength of its asset position or even to pledge the assets directly as collateral.31 Limited
liability and entity shielding are thus mutually reinforcing effects from the standpoint of
the economy for they create “a default regime whereby a shareholder’s personal assets
are pledged as security to his personal creditors, while corporation assets are reserved for
corporation creditors”32:
In an enterprise of any substantial magnitude, this allocation generally
increases the value of both types of assets as security for debt. It permits creditors
of the corporation to have first claim on the corporation’s assets, which those
creditors have a comparative advantage in evaluating and monitoring.
Conversely, it permits an individual’s personal creditors to have first claim on
personal assets, which those creditors are in a good position to evaluate and
monitor and which creditors of the corporation, conversely, are not in a good
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Rajan and Zingales (2003b, p. 16, Table 4).
Hansman, Kraakmann and Squire (2006).
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Hansmann and Kraakman (2004a, p. 9).
31
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position to check. As a consequence, legal personality and limited liability
together can reduce the overall cost of capital to the firm and its owners.33
Although this explanation may appear rather abstract, it makes especially good sense
when one is speaking of large corporations with widely diversified ownership with many
individual equity investors. In these circumstances, the sources of credit for the
corporation are likely to be completely different financial institutions from those that
finance the individual investors. Whether those advantages of the corporate form are as
great in developing countries may depend on the development and diversity of financeproviding institutions.
These advantages of the corporate form are intimately tied up with a legal
characteristic that puts the individual shareholder in a different situation from an
individual creditor and therefore is at the root of the difference between equity and debt
as a source of capital for the corporation. The corporation is in principle perpetual and
therefore the shareholder cannot demand that the corporation cash out his shares. A share
of stock does not mature and become payable (though it is true that so-called preferred
shares are sometimes callable by the corporation).34 A creditor, whether bondholder or
ordinary creditor, is of course tied up for the agreed term of the bond or debt. But a
creditor, unlike a shareholder, can agree on a short term or the debt may even be agreed
to be payable on demand by the creditor. This lock-in effect is satisfactory to large
numbers of shareholders, of course, only in conjunction with the development of the
transferable share, which is usually considered a further advantage of the corporation.35
But the key is the lock-in effect because it means that the corporation is not dissolved, as
in the case of a partnership, when one of the owners dies or simply wants out.
The transferability of corporate shares, in contrast to contractual rights in a
partnership, underpins the perpetual life characteristic of corporations and is thus another
advantage of the corporate form. Transferability also provides liquidity to shareholders.
Finally, it supports savings and investment by individuals by providing opportunities,
through investment in many companies, to build a diversified portfolio, thereby reducing
risk.36
33

Hansmann and Kraakman (2004a, p. 9).
For a general discussion of “lock-in,” see Stout (2004). See also Blair (2003).
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Hansmann and Kraakman (2001, p. 439–40).
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Hansmann and Kraakman (2001, p. 453).
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Finally, in the twentieth century the advantage of the corporation in the hiring of
professional management began to be important in many developed countries, though
even in publicly held corporations dominant shareholders still often hold management
positions, especially in the developing world.37
All of these advantages of the corporation add up to a great strength for an
economy. A prime function of a financial system being to channel funds from the
ultimate savers in a society to enterprises that will invest those funds in productive uses,
the corporation has proved to be efficient for gathering funds for such uses. Although the
corporation can borrow, it is particularly attractive for those investors who are willing to
be last in priority in the case of corporate insolvency in order to be entitled to a
potentially greater return in the event of corporate profitability—which is from the
investor’s point of view the fundamental distinction between equity and debt.
Legal Origin Analysis of Equity Markets
The characteristics of the corporation and the status of shareholders are defined
by law. Some of the underlying rules of corporate law have proved better for economic
development than others. But as in many other legal fields, the greater difference among
countries lies in the enforcement of the rules rather than in their exact content.
Nonetheless, the Legal Origin literature places great emphasis on the substantive rules of
corporate law.
A close look at the methodology of the LLSV study on “Law and Finance” shows
how the Legal Origin approach works in practice.38 The six substantive law rules that
were characterized by LLSV as “anti-director rights” were: (1) “proxy by mail allowed,”
which makes it possible for shareholders to vote without physically showing up at
shareholder meetings; (2) “shares not blocked before meeting,” which precludes
companies from requiring deposit of shares as a prerequisite to shareholder voting and
thereby limiting sales and purchases for a period before and even after shareholder
meetings; (3) “cumulative voting” or “proportional representation,” which allows a
minority to obtain representation on the board; (4) “oppressed minorities mechanism,”
which allows minority shareholders one or more of several remedies in the case of
37

Hansmann and Kraakman (2001, p. 450–51).
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fundamental transactions such as mergers; (5) “preemptive rights,” which make it more
difficult for controlling shareholders to dilute the voting power and/or value of minority
shareholders’ interests; and (6) “percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary
shareholder meeting,” which if kept low gives minority shareholders the power to appeal
to shareholders as a group.39
With respect to the first five “anti-director rights,” which have a binary character,
each of the countries in the Law and Finance survey were given a 1, if the right was
accorded by substantive law, and a zero if the right was not accorded. The sixth antidirector right, not being binary, was scaled to give a 1 where the percentage was at or
below the world median of 10 percent and a zero otherwise. The sums of these scores
were then added, with the possible anti-director rights score ranging from zero to six.
(Other substantive law provisions that might bear on shareholder rights included “oneshare, one-vote,” which preclude dual class shares, and “mandatory dividend,” were also
scored, but can be ignored for present purposes because they played little role in
subsequent Legal Origin analyses.)
The country scores were averaged across legal family (English, French, German
and Scandinavian origin) to give a score for each legal origin. The higher the score, the
greater the protection to minority shareholders the legal family was credited with giving.
In racing terms, one can observe from these averages that English-origin came in far
ahead with 4.00 compared with French-origin and German-origin in a dead-heat for last
at 2.33 and Scandinavian-origin in between at 3.00. Statistical tests showed that
differences between English-origin and the three civil law origins were significant,
indeed significant at a high level (the one-percent level) for the difference between
common law and French/German law.
These kinds of cross-country statistical tests often evoke quite different responses
from economists and lawyers. For most economists and many social scientists such
statistical analyses are necessary to come up with valid general propositions that are more
than impressions. For many lawyers, on the other hand, general propositions are
inherently suspect, especially if they are based on giving legal rules ones and zeros or
otherwise simplifying the richness of detail that one finds in any legal field. In large part
38

Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny (1998). “LLSV”
refers hereafter to the joint work of these four authors.
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this difference lies in the training and perspective of economists and lawyers; economists
are trained to find general principles that lie beneath the churning and discontinuous
surface of life while lawyers are trained to distinguish factually between cases that for
most people seem to be much the same.
Even from a lawyer’s perspective, the results in the Legal Origin literature are
rather powerful. But on further examination, some anomalies can be perceived in the
investor protection results. In the first place, one can question the choice of anti-director
rights. Preemptive rights, for example, have long since virtually disappeared from the
scene in the United States.40 And they have disappeared for the good reason that they
have costs to the corporation and to the economy:
[Preemptive rights] delay new issues of shares by forcing companies to
solicit their own shareholders before turning to the market. They also limit
management’s ability to issue blocks of shares with significant voting power.
Both constraints reduce a company’s ability to raise equity capital, which may
explain why the EU’s Second Company Directive permits those Member
states that allow authorized but unissued shares to also allow shareholders to
waive pre-emption rights. These constraints may also explain why both Japan
and the U.S. states have abandoned preemptive rights as the statutory default,
and why Japanese and U.S. shareholders almost never attempt to override this
default by writing preemptive rights into their corporate charters.41
All U.S. states now make preemptive rights, under which existing shareholders
have the right to participate in any new issuance of equity by subscribing to the offer,
only an optional term in corporate charters.42 This is in fact one of the examples of the
movement of American corporate law toward a default term concept of corporate law,
which allows shareholders either to opt-in or to opt-out of certain terms. The default term
usually chosen is the term that parties forming corporations would normally choose.
Thus, in most if not all states of the United States preemptive rights do not apply unless
they are chosen in the articles of incorporation; in other words, they are opt-in rather than
opt-out provisions (that is, preemptive rights are permissible but not mandatory and they
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LLSV (1998, p. 1122–25, Table 6 and 1126–28).
William T. Allen and Reinier Kraakman, Commentary and Cases on the Law of Business
Organizations 367 (2003).
41
Rock et al. (2004, p. 148).
42
Cox et al. (1997, p. 474).
40

10

must be affirmatively chosen to be applicable).43 In Delaware, which is the state LLSV
chose to represent all U.S. corporate law,44 preemptive rights are opt-in provisions. It is,
to say the least, rather odd that the LLSV test of preemptive rights accords a zero where
preemptive rights are available only on an opt-in basis when they chose a different
approach for proportional representation, according one point where proportional
representation is allowed, though not required.45
Whatever the pros and cons of the default term approach, it seems obvious that
preemptive rights have a smaller role in countries where there is a vigorous market for
new stock issues among widely dispersed shareholders (as illustrated by the atrophying
of preemptive rights in the United States), as compared with countries with primarily
concentrated share ownership. In the absence of a vigorous market for new issues,
preemptive rights are a reflection in part of an assumption that new equity capital for an
existing corporation will most usually have to come from existing shareholders.
Preemptive rights also are a recognition that where share ownership is concentrated, the
relative position of such owners is a major issue. In the absence of preemptive rights, a
controlling shareholder could, for example, gradually squeeze out or otherwise
disadvantage existing minority shareholders, including those who had major stakes but
who, in the absence of a liquid stock market for the company, had little prospect of
selling those stakes to anyone other than the controlling shareholder. Thus, the use of
preemptive rights is a sign of a weak, not a strong, market for corporate equities.
Some important protections for minority shareholders do not find themselves on
LLSV’s list. At least in the United States, the concept of directors’ fiduciary obligations,
particularly the duty of loyalty, is generally regarded as the most important safeguard for
minority shareholders.46 Yet it finds no place in the LLSV list of “anti-director” investor
protection provisions.
An important perspective into the LLSV approach is gained by observing that the
43

The dominant theory of American corporate law that has emerged in recent decades is that a
corporation is essentially a contractual arrangement in the sense that a corporation is a bundle of rights. See
Easterbrook and Fischel (1991). In this vision of the corporation, corporate law is to a substantial degree a
set of default rules; these default rules can be varied if the shareholders agree. See Ayres and Gertner
(1989).
44
LLSV (1998, p. 1128 n. 6).
45
LLSV (1998, p. 1122). In a December 2005 working paper, Djankov and three of the LLSV authors
proposed dealing with the opt-in, opt-out inconsistency by revising the anti-director index. Djankov et al.
(2005).
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adoption of the LLSV anti-director rights is not systematic across legal families.
Cumulative voting (or proportional representation) is possible in only 5 of the 18
common law countries (and then, with respect to the United States, only in some states),
whereas it is found in roughly the same proportion of French law countries. More
important, preemptive rights are required in only 44 percent of common law countries in
contrast to 62 per cent of French law countries (thereby suggesting that, at least if one
takes the LLSV view of preemptive rights, French law origin is in this respect more
protective, not less protective, of minority shareholders than common law origin). The
comparisons suggest that the relative scores for legal families may be more a construct of
the choice of rights deemed to protect minority shareholders than a systematic difference
in shareholder protection among legal families.
Third, because LLSV looked at statutory law and apparently failed to consider
case law, they have scored certain Continental countries too low, according to
commentators from civil law countries. This is certainly an oddity in view of declarations
in LLSV articles about the supposed superiority of judge-made law (that is, of the
common law method).47 According to Cools, LLSV failed to look at functional
equivalents of substantive rules they scored.48 Taking these two and related points
together, Cools claims that LLSV got their conclusions backward: France, according to
Cools, should have gotten a 4 or 5 (or, accounting for recent changes in French law, a 5
or 6) rather than a 3, Belgium a 4 rather than a zero, and the United States should have
received only a 4 rather than 5.49 In other words, according to Cools, French and Frenchorigin law is at least equal to English-origin law, particularly of the U.S. variety.
Similarly, Berndt has criticized as inconsistent the scores with regard to Germany
compared with the United Kingdom with respect to preemptive rights.50
Vagts in turn came, through a detailed analysis of the actual state of corporate law
and practice with regard to the LLSV “anti-director rights” in Germany, to the conclusion
that the difference in national scores between Germany and common law countries “is
not such as to concern an internationally sophisticated lawyer advising a client where to
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Hertig and Kanda (2004, p. 114–18).
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invest.”51 In his view, “It is hard to agree with LLS & V that ‘the evidence points to a
relatively stronger stance favoring all investors in common-law countries.”52
In sum, the LLSV method of selecting certain statutory rights and scoring them,
sometimes on an opt-in basis and sometimes on an opt-out basis, is deficient—according
to some critics—because LLSV have the wrong values for the variables, in part by
ignoring what courts actually do (as opposed to only what statutes explicitly provide) and
in part by ignoring functional substitutes. These shortcomings lead to the observation that
the devil in the LLSV method is definitely in the details. Econometrics unquestionably
has the virtue that it helps to abstract from details in order to highlight regularities. But
one cannot ignore the obvious fact that a failure to use the right values for the variables
or to use consistent methods of assigning those values can produce misleading, even
erroneous, conclusions.
Fourth, even if the variables—that is, the chosen anti-director rights—are roughly
the right ones, the variance among countries within any legal family is remarkably high if
indeed the origin of a country’s law makes a decisive difference, especially for economic
growth in developing countries. Pakistan and India rank at the top of the list in total antidirector rights with a score of 5 out of 6 (along with the United States, Canada and the
United Kingdom) but others like Thailand and Sri Lanka receive only a 2 and a 3,
respectively.53 And in the French law family, Chile achieves a 5 out of 6 whereas many
French law countries receive only a 1 out of 6. Most striking of all, Germany ranks
lowest of all among German law families with a 1 out of 6, whereas Japan—a Germanlaw country—achieves a 4 out of 6.54 Perhaps this oddity can be traced to Japan’s
corporate law being based, thanks to the post-World War II occupation under General
MacArthur, on Illinois law, not German law55; Mattei observes that “Japanese law … is
as much influenced by American legal culture as by German or French.… In corporation
law American legal culture has the lead.”56 Still, a poll of international corporate lawyers
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Vagts (2002, p. 595, 606).
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The reader should be aware that the LLSV classification of Thailand as a common law country is not
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LLSV (1998, p. 1130–31, Table 2).
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West (2001, p. 529).
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might easily come to the conclusion that minority shareholders are at least as well
protected de facto in Germany as in Japan.
In considering the utility of the LLSV-preferred corporate law rules, one
conclusion would be that if the purpose is to look for policy implications and to give
advice to developing countries, one should focus on the pros and cons of particular
shareholder rights, given the nature of particular country’s economies and existing equity
markets and the social norms and other informal constraints that exist in that country. In
that light, the LLSV studies are merely an introduction to a series of issues that each
developing country needs to resolve against this local background. Even though the
influence of legal history and path dependence may be great in many fields of law, it is
likely to be less of a constraint with regard to legal provisions applying to publicly held
corporations and particularly rules governing the issuance and trading of securities.
Reform, especially in the securities field, occurs frequently even in developed countries.
Here the dead hand of the past is less likely to be a constraint than in more traditional
fields.
Several other considerations bear on the proper evaluation of the LLSV antidirector rights approach. First, the authors in the same Law and Finance article claim that
enforcement of corporate law works better in common law than in French law
countries.57 Their conclusion raises the immediate question of whether enforcement is
not a dominant consideration, a point that is of particular relevance to issues of corporate
governance, at least in a country such as the United States recognizing fiduciary duties of
directors and officers and holding them responsible for violations of such duties.58
The Japanese adoption of Illinois corporate law illustrates the critical role of
enforcement in determining the workability of transplanted law. When Japan adopted a
U.S.-style fiduciary “duty of loyalty” as a substantive standard, it failed to provide a
U.S.-style remedy in the form of disgorgement of profits derived by the officer or
director. The oversight is understandable; whereas common law judiciaries are
accustomed to fashioning remedies to effectuate the policy behind a substantive rule,
57
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Japanese courts are not comfortable in giving any remedy not specified by statute. Hence,
a rule that works in one legal system may not fit the legal infrastructure and culture of
another system.59 As a review of countries in transition from communism to capitalism
(especially Russia) shows, a country can enact a modern world-class corporate law
without enjoying the expected benefits if the country fails to consider the enforcement
infrastructure.60
Fiduciary duties, such as the duty of loyalty, are examples of standards. “Rules …
require or prohibit specific behaviors, [but] standards … leave the precise determination
of compliance to adjudicators after the fact.”61 In contrast to well-defined “bright-line”
rules (which call on the judge to make a binary decision—yes or no—whether the rule
has been violated), legal standards require a judge to use mature and trained judgment to
determine whether the standard has been met, taking into account all of the factual
circumstances of the case (often in complicated factual situations, say under the “duty of
loyalty” in a corporate self-dealing case). Common examples of corporate law rules,
which can be thought of as ex ante prohibitions or prescriptions, are “dividend
restrictions,

minimum

capitalization

requirements,

or

capital

maintenance
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requirements.” Those requirements and restrictions are either met or not, and the kinds
of fact-weighing judgments required for standards are usually not necessary for rules.
The economic development issue is whether standards, which are a key to
corporate governance litigation in the United States, make sense for a developing
country. Richard Posner, one of the most respected U.S. Federal appellate judges, thinks
not:
The relative simplicity of rules has two consequences for the kind of weak
judiciary one is apt to find in a poor country. The first is that the application
of rules places fewer demands on the time and the competence of the judges
and is therefore both cheaper and more likely to be accurate. The accuracy is a
little illusory, because it is a property of governance by rules that they never
quite fit the complex reality that they govern. But this observation is
consistent with their being more efficient than standards if administered by a
judiciary that has a limited capability for the kind of nuanced and flexible
decisionmaking that standards require. Second, rules facilitate monitoring of
59
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the judges and so reduce the likelihood of bribery and the influence of politics
in the judicial process. The less discretion a judge has in making decisions,
the easier it will be to determine whether a case has been decided contrary to
law or whether there is a pattern of favoring one class or group of litigants
over another.63
Standards are, of course, not at all unknown to the civil law. But though concepts
such as “good faith” are common in the German Civil Code,64 it is also true that
standards are less used in corporate law in civil law countries than in common law
countries, at least the United States.65 It is curious that the opposite is true in corporate
accounting, where the United States relies on a rulebook, U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Standards (USGAPP), whereas Britain and continental countries rely more
on “principles based” accounting.66 It was precisely the tendency of U.S. companies to
use a “check the box” approach to the rules of USGAPP that led to some of the corporate
scandals in the early 2000s. As we turn to corporate governance issues, it will become
clear that bright line rules are unlikely to be able to deal effectively with self-dealing by
controlling shareholders, and yet standards will be difficult for developing country
judiciaries to apply effectively.
Corporate governance
Despite the great benefits the corporate form brings to an economy, it also
produces Rule of Law problems. A useful perspective on these problems that may be
particularly relevant in developing countries due to the prevalence of concentrated share
ownership in those countries is based on the concept of agency.67As noted above, agency
exists whenever one person acts on behalf of another. It is a ubiquitous phenomenon in
the modern economy; common examples would be a stockbroker buying or selling
securities for a customer and a lawyer acting for a client. The customer and client are the
principals, and the stockbroker and lawyer are agents. The general shape of the legal
problem in any agency relationship is to assure that the agent acts in the interest of the
principal rather than in his own interest or, failing that, to assure that the principal will be
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able to remove the agent and select a new agent.
In the corporate context, because of the relationship between shareholders,
directors, and management, it is not an exaggeration to say that, at base, corporate
governance is fundamentally about agency. The directors and management (in American
parlance, the “officers”) act for the owners, namely the stockholders. It is true that in
some countries (but a much lesser extent in the United States), there is legal support for
the notion that directors and management are to act for other stakeholders (the
community, labor, the environment, and so on) and not just for the shareholders. These
communitarian notions all too often allow directors and management (who in some
countries tend to be the same people) to act in their own interest by purporting to act for a
constituent of convenience of the moment. All too often, this ambiguity as to the
responsibility of the owner’s agents creates its own Rule of Law problems.
In addition, a second agency problem arises when a controlling shareholder or
shareholder block takes action to the detriment of minority shareholders, say by selfdealing. Hansmann and Kraakman explain:
The second agency problem involves the conflict between, on the one
hand, owners who possess the majority or controlling interest in the firm and,
on the other hand, the minority or noncontrolling owners. Here the
noncontrolling owners are the principals and the controlling owners are the
agents, and the difficulty lies in assuring that the former are not expropriated
by the latter.68
The resulting corporate governance problem is exacerbated by the permanence of
a corporation, which is a prime characteristic from which many of its economic
advantages flows. As noted above, an individual shareholder cannot ask for his money
back, and under most corporate charters it takes more than a simple majority of shares to
dissolve the corporation. But therein lies one of the great issues of corporate law and
some of the major choices that countries must make in creating and regulating a
corporate sector. These issues are commonly referred to under the heading of corporate
governance, which recent events have proved to be of the greatest importance not just for
developing countries but also for the most developed countries.
The permanence of a corporation creates a central dilemma for legal policy. If the
68
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shareholder cannot get his money back, then why should he invest in the first place? Of
course, where there is an efficient secondary market for stock, the shareholder can always
simply sell when dissatisfied in view of the transferability characteristic of corporate
shares. But that is not much of an answer for the poorer developing countries, because an
adequate secondary market may itself be difficult to develop. And even in a developed
country, the sale option for individual shareholders does not work well for corporations
that have not “gone public.” Thus, the fact that the management controls the assets of the
corporation and the shareholders have at most whatever residual rights over the
corporation that corporate law and the corporate charter give them leads to the muchdiscussed problem of the separation of management and control—or to put it differently
the relative absence of the ultimate owners’ control over management.
The essence of the corporate governance issue in most developing countries, in
contrast, arises from the fact that the great majority of even the largest corporations do
not have widely diversified shareholdings but rather are controlled by a single
shareholder or by a family or other block. On the positive side, this means that
controlling shareholders are in a far better position to monitor management than is the
case for widely diversified shareholders. But when there is concentration of ownership,
the risk is that a minority shareholder may find himself at the mercy of a controlling
shareholder who may seek to transfer the value of the minority shareholding to himself
by some form of self-dealing. Of course, sometimes control is in a group or in a family,
but the problem is the same.
The means of making this transfer takes many forms, sometimes by outright selfdealing, sometimes by seizing an opportunity that belongs to the corporation, and
sometimes by high salaries, extravagant expenses and other techniques for private
enjoyment of corporate assets. Other means involve transactions between the controlled
public corporation and a company solely owned by the control person or group; in such a
situation, a below arms-length price of a sale of corporate assets to the latter (or an above
arms-length price of a purchase) will suffice. In short, the ability of the control person or
group to select transfer prices on transactions with (in effect) themselves is the key.
These methods are often referred to, depending on the context, in pejorative terms
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ranging from the private benefits of control to expropriation of minority shareholding
interests.69
The failure to solve the private benefits/expropriation problem adequately
inevitably leads to scandals and setbacks that are a threat to public and corporate
confidence and therefore may impede economic development. One could say that that
failure is one of the reasons that the dominance of dispersed shareholding free of control
by a single shareholder or group is by and large a phenomenon limited to the United
States and the United Kingdom.70 Elsewhere in the world, even though stock markets
may exist, a substantial proportion (often a majority) of listed corporations is controlled
by a single shareholder or group of shareholders. Indeed, even in the United States
several hundred publicly traded firms have one shareholder with more than 50 percent of
the shares.71 Obviously in an otherwise widely held corporation, ownership of 20 or even
10 percent of the shares may be enough for de facto control, enabling a de facto
controlling shareholder to select directors and thereby indirectly determine corporate
policy. Most countries have a much higher percentage of concentrated ownership in their
publicly held corporations than the United States and the United Kingdom. The
controlling shareholders often also manage the corporation (which is of course a solution,
though less than an adequate solution, to the much-discussed separation of management
and control); indeed, this pattern of owner-managers is often found in family
companies—that is, companies where the controlling owners are members of the same
family.
The pattern of concentrated ownership, often family ownership, is widespread in
continental Europe. A recent study of the French corporate world characterized the
ownership structure as having three salient features: “(1) concentration of ownership; (2)
extensive family ownership; and (3) the role of holding companies.”72 In Germany as late
as “the mid-1990s two-thirds of all listed companies … had one blockholder with a stake
exceeding 25 per cent.73 In Italy a history of inter-war nationalizations and subsequent
69
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partial privatizations, coupled with a number of large family controlled companies,
initially led in the post-war period to the dominance of concentrated ownership;
nevertheless, a series of legal changes in the 1990s led to a somewhat more diversified
ownership structure.74
Concentrated ownership is no doubt even more common in some countries,
particularly in the developing world. In a survey of the 20 largest publicly held
corporations in 27 countries, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer found that only
about one-third were widely held. In their survey “widely held” was narrowly construed
to mean that no person or family held directly or indirectly more than 20 percent of the
shares. Among a sample of medium-sized corporations, the proportion of widely held
was less than one-quarter. 75
From the standpoint of economic development, what is striking about this
research can be deduced from the few developing countries found among the 27
countries examined in the survey (Argentina, Mexico, South Korea and Israel). All of
those developing countries were middle income countries, and the percentage of
concentrated ownership (at the 20 percent control level) among the 20 largest and the
sample of medium-sized corporations within those countries was well above average for
the 27 countries as a whole. Of these middle income developing countries Argentina and
Mexico had no widely held companies among either the top 20 largest or the mediumsized corporations. South Korea, however, counted 55 percent widely held in the first
category and 30 percent in the second category, and hence is more like Continental
Europe than other developing countries in the survey or the United States. Israel’s
numbers were closer to Argentina and Mexico than South Korea.76
This survey of corporate ownership developed some further data that point to the
fact that in many countries over one-third of large publicly held corporations were family
controlled (at the 20 percent share level), as were almost one-half of the sample of
medium-size publicly traded companies.77 Many of these family controlled corporations
account for a large percentage of publicly traded corporations within their countries: over
74
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one-quarter on average of the 20 largest firms in the study’s 27 countries, over one-half
in Argentina, and 100 percent in Mexico.
Perhaps the most important point about family control is that “(at least) 69
percent of the time, families that control firms also participate in management.”78 This
figure was 95 percent in Mexico, 75 percent in South Korea, and 62 percent in Argentina.
Further, participation in management was given a narrow definition to assure that the
participation was at the top of the company. The significance of family control with
management participation is apparent when one considers minority shareholders who run
the risk of expropriation both by controlling shareholders and by management separately.
The experience in Russia was that the combined efforts of controlling shareholders and
of management were devastating for minority shareholders.79
Dual Class Shares and Pyramids
Controlling shareholders are perhaps a fact of life, but corporate law itself in most
countries permits controlling shareholders to magnify their ability to control a
corporation. Among the legal means at their disposal are two widely used techniques.
One is to create two (or more) classes of shares, one without voting rights and the other
with voting rights, the latter issued to the controlling shareholder (or the controlling
group of shareholders). A second technique involves pyramiding, in which control is
magnified by holding shares through a series of controlled corporations. To take one
simple albeit atypical example of pyramiding, an individual or a family might hold 20
percent of an otherwise widely held corporation, which in turn held 20 percent of the
target, also an otherwise widely held corporation. In effect, the ultimate shareholder
could achieve de facto control with only 4 percent of the total investment (or put
differently, with only 20 percent of what would be required to achieve de facto control by
direct ownership of shares in the target). In this light, the purpose of pyramiding can be
seen to be primarily control of the corporation with a lesser investment. This
achievement of de facto control in turn facilitates self-dealing by the controlling group.
The use of dual class shares is tailor-made for self-dealing. A cross-country study
by Nenova involving all dual class firms in the 18 countries (among the 20 largest
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national capital markets) that allow dual classes of shares differing in voting rights found
substantial private benefits of control. Under the methodology used and assuming that the
two classes of stock have similar attributes (for example, the same dividend rates) other
than the right to vote, the private benefits of control can be measured by the difference
between the market value of the voteless shares and the price commanded by the voting
shares in a sale of control. The private benefits of control in the dual class share situation
can be interpreted as the percentage of the value of the firm that controlling shareholders
can expropriate from minority shareholders. Remarkably the potential expropriation
ranged as high as 28 percent of the value of the firm in South Korea and 36 percent in
Mexico.80 The most important factor in determining the extent of expropriation, however,
was not the nature of substantive legal protections or of takeover rules, but rather the
quality of enforcement—showing again the crucial role of an independent and effective
judiciary.81
To see, however, the point about the control of the corporation’s cash flow, an
example involving the practice of pyramiding is useful. Let us assume the ultimate
shareholder owns 50 percent of a first-tier public company that in turns owns 50 percent
of another public company—the second tier company—so that control is not at risk in
either tier. Then, with only a 25 percent indirect ownership (50 percent of 50 percent),
the ultimate shareholder can easily direct speculation in new ventures by the second-tier
company. Take speculation in high-risk ventures (by definition, ventures that involve a
small chance of a big payoff and a large chance of loss): The ultimate shareholder’s
proportion of wins versus losses does not change, but he is able to control the decisions
with a much smaller personal investment. This kind of pyramiding is sometimes used, for
example, in the domestic U.S. real estate industry to allow promoters to diversify their
investment across more real estate ventures than their personal funds would otherwise
permit. Pyramids, however, also allow the ultimate shareholder to engage in self-dealing
by transactions between himself (or a corporation he controls) and a company in the
pyramid that he controls only by reason of the pyramid. From this possibility arises the
corporate governance challenge of pyramiding.
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An alternative explanation, raising further corporate governance issues, is that
pyramiding allows controlling shareholders to economize on capital transactions
involving assets they own outright, thereby facilitating the transfer of wealth out of
publicly held companies to themselves.
The corporate ownership research previously analyzed gives some examples of
pyramiding from Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea. The Hong Kong example
involves its most prominent company, Hutchison Whampoa, where the Li family held 35
percent of Cheung Kong Holdings, which in turn owned 43.9 percent of Hutchison
Whampoa. The authors also give a more dramatic example in the South Korean firm,
Samsung Electronics, whose chairman controlled Samsung with only a 14.1 percent
ownership of two companies that in turn held Samsung stock.82
The Blockholder Phenomenon
Much scholarly literature concludes that well-dispersed shareholding can only be
expected to develop in countries where corporate law reaches adequate solutions to the
corporate governance problem. Put differently, concentration of ownership—at least to
the extent of a group of so-called “blockholders” being able to act on behalf of the
shareholders as a group—is an inevitable consequence of inadequate corporate
governance rules. The blockholders can, acting together, control the management. Of
course, in many cases—especially with family firms—the blockholders are the
management, and in those cases minority shareholders are potentially doubly vulnerable.
In short, concentrated ownership involving control by a few individuals, especially by a
family, may turn out to be desirable for minority shareholders insofar as the controlling
owner can monitor the management and keep it focused on the success of the company
(as opposed to the managers’ own perquisites and incomes). Consider, for example, the
outstanding stock market performance of the family-controlled Wal-Mart over recent
decades in the United States. But concentrated ownership coupled with deficient legal
protections for minority shareholders can be another matter entirely.
Consequently, even where there are neither dual class shares nor pyramidal
arrangements, controlling shareholders can be in a position in some countries to take
where controlling shareholders devote their energy to diverting resources from minority shareholders rather
than to managing the enterprise.
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pecuniary advantage of minority shareholders. Dyck and Zingales found that control
premiums (the excess of the price per share when control was sold over the price in
ordinary share trading) ranged on average as high as 27 percent in Argentina, 65 percent
in Brazil, 37 percent in Turkey, and 58 percent in the Czech Republic.83
Legal institutions thus play a vital role in the development of equity capital
markets. In a prior chapter, a central problem of governance of countries was
addressed—namely, the difficulty of constructing a political and legal system strong
enough to guarantee citizens that a predatory ruler would not expropriate their property.
The issue of corporate governance is a close analogue. As the foregoing discussion
makes clear, corporate governance problems come in two parts in many developing
countries. First, if shareholders, certainly small shareholders, cannot control the
management, how can they be protected against expropriation of the value of their
economic interest by management? Second, in the case of the blockholder solution to the
first problem (a solution to the extent that the blockholders, at least collectively, can
discharge the management), the minority shareholders find themselves at risk of being
expropriated by the blockholders. This second version of the expropriation issue is
especially severe when the blockholders and the management are the same people,
because then the first and second problems merge to the disadvantage of minority
shareholders. And where the two problems merge, it is likely to be very difficult to raise
money from small shareholders; the economy therefore has a more difficult challenge in
channeling savings from ultimate savers to productive uses. This set of challenges has
proved a particular problem in transition countries such as Russia and in developing
countries—especially East Asia—where so-called relationship capitalism is dominant.
Legal Protection
In the context of legal protection of minority investors, three kinds of protection
should be distinguished: corporate law, securities law, and stock exchange listing
requirements. Most of the focus in the development literature has been on corporate law.
Thus, the original article by LLSV addressed, as we have seen, substantive rules of
corporate law. The Legal Origins approach was partially validated in the Nenova study of
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expropriation potential, reviewed above, with the median value of control-block votes
highest in French civil law countries (22.6 percent), followed by German civil law
countries (11.0 percent), and then by common law and Scandinavian civil law counties
(only 1.6 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively).84 Dyck and Zingales found, however,
that any supposed advantage of common law over French law with regard to control
premiums disappeared once certain non-legal factors such as newspaper circulation and
tax compliance were included in their regressions.85
An approach to economic development in the equity capital area that would be
primarily focused on bringing best practice to developing countries through the process
of legal transplantation would run into several kinds of hurdles—the nature of the
substantive rules and the ways in which the courts deal with those rules. Even accepting
that the LLSV list of corporate law provisions was not optimum and that a better set of
rules could be devised, the nature of the enforcement of the rules must be taken into
account.
The lack of enforcement led to serious problems in Russia and in other transition
countries in the early days in the 1990s after the demise of the Soviet Union,86 and can be
seen more recently in several recent Latin American cases involving abuse by controlling
shareholders. The first became public only because the firm and people involved were
charged by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission with U.S. securities violations
involving concealing a scheme involving a major Mexican entrepreneur, Ricardo Salinas
Pliego, in which Salinas Pliego personally profited by $109 million.87 Salinas Pliego is
alleged to have used his control of the holding company of TV Azteca, a major Mexican
television chain, to enter into a complex transaction involving two related companies.
The purchase of the debt of one related company for one-third of its face value was
followed by the payment by that company of the debt at the full face value to net a profit
of more than $200 million for insiders. In this Mexican corporate governance debacle
enforcement was in the hands of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission because
83
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of an SEC filing by TV Azteca. 88
The second such case involved the CEO and six executives of a Chilean
electricity utility. After the privatization of the formerly state-owned company, a Spanish
utility holding company acquired stock in Chilean holding companies that in turn held
stock in the Chilean utility. These Chilean holding companies had two classes of stock,
Class A which held most of the equity of the Chilean utility but no voting rights and
Class B with little equity but majority voting power. Class A shares were held by small
shareholders and pension funds, and Class B shares by the executives. The price paid to
the executives, whose class B shares controlled the utility, was 1000 percent greater than
the price paid for the Class A shares of the small shareholders and the pension funds.
While the case may illustrate the value of control, the case also shows a great corporate
governance problem that became a scandal in Chile. In this Chilean case the problems
seems to have arisen because of deficient substantive law and the absence of any
effective enforcement mechanism.89
Securities Laws
A second reason why legal differences play a large role in the corporate area has
to do with the securities laws. With widely dispersed shareholders, the availability of
remedies with regard to disclosure of information to such shareholders is particularly
important. As Black has observed, it is hard to envision strong securities markets without
a strong legal foundation:
Creating strong public securities markets is hard. That securities markets
exist at all is magical, in a way. Investors pay enormous amounts of money to
strangers for completely intangible rights, whose value depends entirely on
the quality of information that the investors receive and on the sellers’
honesty.90
In a 2006 study La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer found, using their crosscountry regression methodology, that securities laws are particularly important to the
development of a strong financial sector and especially to achieving a large stock market
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capitalization as a percentage of GDP.91 Indeed, they found that their measure of
corporate law effectiveness loses most of its explanatory power for stock market
development when securities law variables concerning disclosure and standard of
liability for failure to disclose adequately are included in their regressions.92 In short,
corporate law may be primarily important for protection of minority shareholders in
closely held corporations, where stock is not sold to the public, but stock market
development depends considerably more on the quality of securities laws than on the
quality of corporate law, at least as the original Legal Origin articles measure corporate
law quality.
What is particularly striking about the 2006 study is the finding that the existence
of securities laws mattered but that the most important factor was private enforcement
allowing financial recovery by injured investors for securities law violations. In contrast,
they found that enforcement by a government agency was of relatively little importance.
Specifically, they found that public enforcement plays a modest role at best in the
development of the stock market. On the other hand, mandatory disclosure was
important, in part because it made it easier for investors to recover damages in private
litigation.93 These findings suggest that good substantive law and a competent
independent judiciary go hand in hand in this legal area as well as others.
These findings are especially interesting because unlike traditional legal
institutions, securities regulation is a recent phenomenon. It first came to England at the
end of the 1920s and to the United States with the Securities Act of 1933. Both were the
result of legislation, not the common law nor general corporate law. This necessarily
raises some doubts about what it means to say that legal origin has much to do with the
efficacy of securities laws in different countries. Moreover, the rules on securities
regulation are almost entirely statutory and regulatory even in common law countries.
Yet the emphasis on the importance of investor recovery of damages for losses would
seem to depend on a greater willingness of common law countries to rely on an
independent judiciary to enforce even highly technical statutory and regulatory law. Once
again, enforcement is at least as important as the content of substantive law.
The importance of enforcement, including public enforcement, to the
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success of securities regulation was brought home with force in the development of stock
markets in the transition countries of Eastern Europe. Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer
studied the experiences of Poland and the Czech Republic. They found that Poland
“created an independent and highly motivated regulator to enforce the rules” but that the
Czech Republic, in contrast, left enforcement to “an unmotivated office in the finance
ministry.”94 The result in Poland was “rapid development of securities markets” enabling
“a number of firms to raise external funds,” but the Czech securities scene was
characterized by “delistings and a notable absence of equity finance through a public
market by either new or existing firms.”95 Thus, where private litigation is not available
as an enforcement tool, vigorous public enforcement is especially important.
The difference in the size of the equity markets in the two countries shows the
significance of the difference in enforcement. Though the Czech stock market was twice
as big as the Polish stock market in 1995 -- $9.2 billion to $4.6 billion – the situation was
more than reversed by 2001, with the Czech market size essentially unchanged and the
Polish market having increased over fivefold to $26 billion.96

93

LLS (2006, p. 14, 20).
Glaeser et al. (2001, p. 855).
95
Glaeser et al. (2001, p. 855–856).
96
Berglöf and Pajuste (2003).
94

28

References
Allen, William T. and Reinier Kraakman. 2003. Commentaries and Cases on the Law of
Business Organization. New York: Aspen Publishers.
Ayres, Ian, and Robert Gertner. 1989. Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules. Yale Law Journal 99: 87–130.
Baskin, Jonathan Barron, and Paul J. Miranti, Jr. 1997. A History of Corporate Finance.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Beck, Thorsten, and Ross Levine. Legal Institutions and Financial Development. NBER
Working Paper No. 10126 (December 2003 draft).
Benston, George J., Michael Bromwich, Robert E. Litan, and Alfred Wagenhofer. 2006.
Worldwide Financial Reporting: The Development and Future of Accounting Standards.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Berglöf, Erik, and Stijn Claessens. 2004. Corporate Governance and Enforcement. World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3409 (September, 2004 draft).
Berglöf, Erik, and Anete Pajuste. 2003 Emerging Owners, Eclipsing Markets? Corporate
Governance in Central and Eastern Europe, in P. Cornelius and B. Kogut (eds.),
Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Berndt, Markus. 2002. Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems. Wiesbaden:
Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag.
Black, Bernard S. 2001. The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets. U.C.L.A. Law Review 48: 781–855.
Black, Bernard S., and Anna S. Tarassova. 2002. Institutional Reform in Transition: A Case
Study of Russia. Supreme Court Economic Review 10: 211–277.
Black, Bernard, Reinier Kraakman, and Anna Teresova. 2000. Russian Privatization and
Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong? Stanford Law Review 52: 1731–1808.
Blair, Margaret M. 2003. Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organization in the Nineteenth Century. U.C.L.A. Law Review 51: 387–455.
Blumberg, Phillip I. 1986. Limited Liability and Corporate Groups. Journal of Corporation
Law 11: 573–631.
Chaudhuri, K. N. 1965. The English East India Company: The Study of an Early Joint Stock
Company, 1600-1640. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
Clarke, Alvaro. 2003. Annex B: Case Studies, Lesson of Recent Reform Efforts. The Politics
of Implementing Corporate Governance Reform: Some Lessons from the Chilean
Experience. In White Paper on Corporate Governance in Latin America, Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, 40–45. Paris: OECD.
Cools, Sofie. 2005. The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and
Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 30:
697-766.

29

Cox, James D., Thomas Lee Hazen, and F. Hodge O’Neal. 1997. Corporations. New York:
Aspen Law & Business.
Davis, John P. 1905. Corporations: A Study of the Origin and Development of Great
Business Combinations and of Their Relation to the Authority of the State, Vol. I. G. New
York and London: P. Putnam’s Sons.
Dempsey, Mary A. In the Crosshairs. LatinFinance, No. 165. April 2005. 44–48.
Easterbrook, Frank H., and Daniel R. Fischel. 1991. The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Evans, Frank. 1908. The Evolution of the English Joint Stock Limited Trading Company.
Columbia Law Review 8(5): 339–361 and 8(6): 461–80.
Glaeser, Edward, Simon Johnson, and Andrei Shleifer. 2001. Coase versus the Coasians.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(3): 853–99.
Goldman, Marshall I. 2003. The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry. London
and New York: Routledge.
Hansmann, Henry, and Reinier Kraakman. 2004a. What is Corporate Law? In The Anatomy
of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, ed. Reinier R. Kraakman et
al., 1–19. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2004b. Agency Problems and Legal Strategies. In The Anatomy of Corporate Law:
A Comparative and Functional Approach, ed. Reinier R. Kraakman et al., 21–31.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2004c. The Basic Governance Structure. In The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A
Comparative and Functional Approach, ed. Reinier R. Kraakman et al., 33–70. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
———. 2001. The End of History for Corporate Law. Georgetown Law Journal 89: 439–68.
Harris, Ron. 2004. The Formation of the East India Company as a Deal between
Entrepreneurs and Outside Investors. Working Paper (July 25, 2004 draft). Available at
[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=567941].
———. 2000. Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization,
1720-1844. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hertig, Gerard, and Hideki Kanda. 2004. Related Party Transactions. In The Anatomy of
Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, ed. Reinier R. Kraakman et
al., 101–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Holderness, Clifford G., and Dennis P. Sheehan. 1988. The Role of Majority Shareholders in
Publicly Held Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 317-46.
Kanda, Hideki, and Curtis J. Milhaupt. 2003. Re-examining Legal Transplants: The
Director’s Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law. American Journal of Comparative
Law 51: 887–901.
Kindleberger, Charles P. 1984. A Financial History of Western Europe. London: George
Allen & Unwin.
Kuran, Timur. 2004. The Economic Ascent of the Middle East’s Religious Minorities: The

30

Role of Islamic Legal Pluralism. Journal of Legal Studies 33: 475–515.
———. 2003. The Islamic Commercial Crisis: Institutional Roots of Economic
Underdevelopment in the Middle East. Journal of Economic History 63: 414–46.
Lamoreaux, Naomi R., and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal. 2005. Legal Regime and Contractual
Flexibility: A Comparison of France and the United States during the Era of
Industrialization. American Law and Economic Review 7(1): 28–61.
La Porta, Raphael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2003. What Works in
Securities Laws? Working Paper (September 4, 2004 draft). Available at
[http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papers/securities_0907.pdf].
———. 1999. Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance 54(2) 471–517.
LaPorta, Raphael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. Law
and Finance. 1998. Journal of Political Economy 106(6): 1113–1155.
Mattei, Ugo. 1997. Comparative Law and Economics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press.
Murphy, Antoin E. Corporate Ownership in France: The Importance of History. NBER
Working Paper No. 10716 (August 2004 draft).
Nenova, Tatiana. 2003. The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country
Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 68: 325–51.
Pistor, Katharina, Martin Raiser, and Stanislaw Gelfer. 2000. Law and Finance in Transition
Economies. Economics of Transition 8(2) 325–68.
Posner, Richard A. 1998. Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development. World
Bank Research Observer 13(1): 1–11.
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales. 2003a. Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists:
Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity.
New York: Crown Business.
———. 2003b. The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the
Twentieth Century. Journal of Financial Economics 69: 5–50.
Rock, Edward, Hideki Kanda, and Reinier Kraakman. 2004. Significant Corporate Actions.
In The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, ed. Reinier
R. Kraakman et al., 131–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schmidt, Reinhard H. 2004.Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective.
In The German Financial System, ed. Jan Pieter Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, 386–
424. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scott, William Robert. 1912. The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish
Joint-Stock Companies to 1720, Vol I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stout, Lynn A. 2004. On the Nature of Corporations. UCLA School of Law, Law &
Economics Research Paper No. 04-13.
Vagts, Detlev, Comparative Company Law—The New Wave. 2002. In Festschrift für Jean
Nicolas Durey, ed. Rainer J. Schweizer, Herbert Burkert and Urs Gasser, 595-605.
Zurich: Schulthess Juristiches Medien AG.

31

Wallis, John Joseph. 2004. The Concept of Systematic Corruption in American Political and
Economic History. NBER Working Paper No. 10952 (December 2004 draft),
forthcoming in Corruption and Reform, ed. Claudia Golden and Ed Glaeser.
West, Mark D. 2001. The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and Explanation
from Japan and the United States. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150: 527–601.
Zweigert, Konrad and Hein Kötz. 1998. Introduction to Comparative Law, 3d revised ed.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Kenneth W. Dam
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
kdam@law.uchicago.edu

32

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
For a listing of papers 1–174 please go to Working Papers at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Douglas G. Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps (January 2003)
David A. Weisbach, Measurement and Tax Depreciation Policy: The Case of Short-Term Assets (January
2003)
Randal C. Picker, Understanding Statutory Bundles: Does the Sherman Act Come with the 1996
Telecommunications Act? (January 2003)
Douglas Lichtman and Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications: Iowa Utilities and
Verizon (January 2003)
William Landes and Douglas Lichtman, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic
Perspective (February 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics (March 2003)
Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks (March 2003)
Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification and Distortion (April 2003)
Richard A. Epstein, The “Necessary” History of Property and Liberty (April 2003)
Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (April 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalizm Is Not an Oxymoron (May 2003)
Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (May 2003)
Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence (May 2003)
Alan O. Sykes, International Trade and Human Rights: An Economic Perspective (May 2003)
Saul Levmore and Kyle Logue, Insuring against Terrorism—and Crime (June 2003)
Richard A. Epstein, Trade Secrets as Private Property: Their Constitutional Protection (June 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay (June 2003)
Amitai Aviram, The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems (July 2003)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Decreasing Liability Contracts (July 2003)
David A. Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs (September 2003)
William L. Meadow, Anthony Bell, and Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Memories: What Was the Standard
of Care for Administering Antenatal Steroids to Women in Preterm Labor between 1985 and 2000?
(September 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage (September
2003)
Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and Content (September 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of
Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation (September 2003)
Avraham D. Tabbach, The Effects of Taxation on Income Producing Crimes with Variable Leisure Time
(October 2003)
Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel (October 2003)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight (October 2003)
David A. Weisbach, Corporate Tax Avoidance (January 2004)
David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk (January 2004)
Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law (April 2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy (January 2004)
Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication (February 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Are Poor People Worth Less Than Rich People? Disaggregating the Value of Statistical
Lives (February 2004)
Richard A. Epstein, Disparities and Discrimination in Health Care Coverage; A Critique of the Institute of
Medicine Study (March 2004)
Richard A. Epstein and Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady
the Course on Hatch-Waxman (March 2004)
Richard A. Esptein, The Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules (April 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum (April 2004)
Alan O. Sykes, The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute (May 2004)
Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor within
and between Law Firms (April 2004)
Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard, Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge:
Theory and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry (April 2004)
James C. Spindler, Conflict or Credibility: Analyst Conflicts of Interest and the Market for Underwriting
Business (July 2004)
Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Public International Law (July 2004)
Douglas Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable (July 2004)

33

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Shlomo Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler, Stephen P. Utkus, and Cass R. Sunstein, Company Stock, Market
Rationality, and Legal Reform (July 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Deliberation, Statistical Means, and Information Markets (August 2004,
revised October 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions against What? The Availability Heuristic and Cross-Cultural Risk Perceptions
(August 2004)
M. Todd Henderson and James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of Perks (August 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death (August 2004)
Randal C. Picker, Cyber Security: Of Heterogeneity and Autarky (August 2004)
Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should We Invest in Reducing Entry
Barriers? (September 2004)
Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law (September 2004)
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law (2000)
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment (October 2004)
Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, and the WTO (October 2004)
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation (November 2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy (December 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War (December 2004)
Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help (December 2004)
Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice (December 2004)
Eric A. Posner, Is the International Court of Justice Biased? (December 2004)
Alan O. Sykes, Public vs. Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Of Standing and Remedy
(February 2005)
Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies (March
2005)
Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law (March 2005)
Randal C. Picker, Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological Contracts (March 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of LifeLife Tradeoffs (March 2005)
Alan O. Sykes, Trade Remedy Laws (March 2005)
Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The Evolving Product, Phoning Home, and the Duty of Ongoing Design
(March 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic (April 2005)
James C. Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Response (May 2005)
Douglas Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to Meurer and Nard (May 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism (May 2005)
Douglas G. Baird, Property, Natural Monopoly, and the Uneasy Legacy of INS v. AP (May 2005)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance
(May 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War (May 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero (May 2005)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities (July 2005)
Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal
Income Tax (July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein and Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and
Ingergenerational Equity (July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing: A Consumer’s Guide (July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test? (July 2005)
David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting (August 2005)
Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach (September 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Voting Rules (August 2005)
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure (August 2005)
Douglas G. Baird and Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization
Bargain (September 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Reparations as Rough Justice (September 2005)
Arthur J. Jacobson and John P. McCormick, The Business of Business Is Democracy (September 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform (October 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Availability Heuristic, Intuitive Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Climate Change
(November 2005)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude (November 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Fast, Frugal, and (Sometimes) Wrong (November 2005)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Total Liability for Excessive Harm (November 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism (November 2005)

34

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

278.
279.
280.

Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is (November 2005,
revised January 2006)
Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares, and Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe
Neighborhoods in Chicago (November 2005)
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets
(December 2005)
Kenneth W. Dam, Institutions, History, and Economics Development (January 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, Land, Law and Economic Development (January 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism (January 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply (January 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, China as a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth (January 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism (January 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Should We Aggregate Mental Hospitalization and Prison Population Rates in Empirical
Research on the Relationship between Incarceration and Crime, Unemployment, Poverty, and Other Social
Indicators? On the Continuity of Spatial Exclusion and Confinement in Twentieth Century United States
(January 2006)
Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the Budget Process (January 2006)
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility under
International Law (February 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, Equity Markets, The Corporation and Economic Development (February 2006)

35

